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ABSTRACT 
This study intends to discuss the empirical aftermath of Indonesia’s first policy 
implementation of the Village Law 2014 the village fiscal transfers: the new 
village fund (Dana Desa) from the state with the prior fiscal transfers from the 
regency for the villages, focussing on allocation and expenditure action in Banjar 
Regency, South Kalimantan Province. The study findings show that the village 
fiscal transfers are dominantly allocated equally/same amount for every village 
and some allocated proportionally depend on the weight of village variables. 
Despite resulting inequality in allocation, the main considerations of the alloca- 
tion method are to have village fiscal sufficiency and maintain state-regency- 
villages relation. The high increase of expenditures is mostly in infrastructure 
development and remuneration for village officials. In spending, the village gov- 
ernment has to improve the accountability especially the punctuality of upward 
accountability and starts to initiate the downward accountability. Overlapping 
authorities between regency and village, and limitations in human resources 
should be solved immediately to smooth the process of decentralisation to vil- 
lages. 
Keywords: Village Fiscal Transfers, Decentralisation. 
 
ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk membahas secara empiris setelah implementasi 
kebijakan pertama terkait dengan Pemerintah Desa tahun 2014 transfer fiskal 
desa: dana desa baru dari negara dengan transfer fiscal sebelumnya dari 
kabupaten untuk setiap desa, yang berfokuskan pada alokasi dan tindakan 
pembelanjaan di Kabupaten Banjar, Provinsi Kalimantan Selatan. Temuan 
penelitian ini menunjukan bahwa transfer fiscal desa secara dominan dialokasikan 
sama untuk setiap desa dan sebagian dialokasikan secara proporsional bergantung 
pada berat variable setiap desa. Meskipun menghasilkan ketidaksetaraan dalam 
alokasi, pertimbangan utama metode alokasi adalah memiliki kecukupan fiscal 
desa dan memelihara hubungan antara kabupaten/kota. Tingginya kenaikan 
belanja sebagian besar dalam pembangunan infrastruktur dan remunerasi bagi 
apparat desa. Dalam pembelanjaan, pemerintah desa harus memperbaiki 
akuntabilitas terutama ketepatan tanggung jawab ke atas dan mulai melakukan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pertanggungjawaban ke bawah. Otoritas yang tumpeng tindih antara kabupaten dan 
desa, serta keterbatasan sumber daya manusia harus segera diatasi untuk memperlancar 
proses desentralisasi ke desa-desa. 
Kata kunci: transfer fiscal desa, desentralisasi. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, after fourteen years of decentralisation, the govern- 
ment initiated the implementation of Law 6/2014 with regards 
to promoting villages and reversed the national development strat- 
egy from top to bottom at the grass-roots level. This was compa- 
rable to the previous decentralisation policy, in which the cen- 
tral government distributed functions and responsibilities regard- 
ing financial resources to provinces, regencies, and cities. The 
village decentralisation has a similar pattern but comes with dif- 
ferent principle and approach. In addition, the policy attracts 
attention from the national to local level. Lewis (2015) has con- 
ducted research on village fund allocation and argued that the 
implementation of this policy is too rushed, all money and no 
plan. He concluded that village fund is dominantly distributed 
unequally regardless the actual size of villages. While it may be 
true, the big question is: are villages ready for decentralisation? 
Other research from Antlov et.al. (2016) predicts the implica- 
tions of 2014 Village Law referred to the impact of previous vil- 
lage policy. He said the impact of the Village Law 2014 is prom- 
ising for the villager in the condition that the implementer has a 
strong financial management system and competent regulations. 
Theoretically, decentralisation has positive impact for the lo- 
cal entity like it could increase local financial resources, it cre- 
ates flexibility for the local entity to act effectively in responding 
to local voices and needs (Rondinelli & Cheema, 2007). On the 
other hand, Smoke et al. (2006, pp. 3-4) argued: “decentraliza- 
tion is neither a panacea for public sector ills nor an inevitable 
obstacle of effective government”. Expectation and result of 
decentralisation might be different. Smoke (2006) named some 
unwanted results of desentralisation, for example subnational 
deficits and debt, and local corruption that might threaten ei- 
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ther national and local fiscal stability. These two opinions re- 
mind that the result of decentralisation differ and it depends on 
the implementer. 
Further, Rondinelli & Cheema (2007) states that 
decentralisation is more than authority/responsibility transfer 
but it is also division of authority and resources in public policy. 
Governance decentralisation practices appear in four forms: 
political, administrative, fiscal and economic. Fiscal 
decentralisation is defined as sharing public revenues among 
government tiers and fiscal delegation in expenditure allocation. 
In reality, there is a gap between local government fiscal resources 
with local government expenditure fiscal needs. Therefore, fis- 
cal transfers play the role to minimize the gap. Takahashi (2012) 
thinks that fiscal transfer schemes is crucial for successful fiscal 
decentralisation. Also, Uchimura (2012) noted the need for fis- 
cal transfers is emphasized for the purpose of equity and mainte- 
nance of certain national standards for public service across re- 
gions. 
In this study, the research is undertaken at the regency and 
village levels of the village decentralisation policy regarding fis- 
cal transfers for villages with the objective of identifying issues 
empirically, while also providing criticism and discussion. The 
fiscal transfers could be considered an essential part of village 
decentralisation. This paper limits its discussion to the alloca- 
tion of fiscal transfers and outcomes after expenditures spend- 
ing. The research questions of this paper are how are the village 
fiscal transfers allocated to villages? How is the equity applied in 
the allocation method? How do the villages spend the village 
fiscal transfers? What problems or limitations arise in this early 
implementation? While it has been said that it is too soon to 
judge the outcomes, the author believes that this research paper 
will contribute to the improvement of Indonesian village 
decentralisation policy. Indonesia has 80,000+ rural and urban 
villages (BPS, 2015), so it would take a lot of effort to explain the 
exact phenomena. As such, a case study is appropriate, with the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banjar Regency chosen as the site, even though it is not a repre- 
sentation of all villages in Indonesia. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: FOUNDATION OF VILLAGE 
DECENTRALISATION 
Indonesia’s administration classifies its territory into 34 prov- 
inces (provinsi), 416 regencies (kabupaten: in other English litera- 
tures, the appellation of kabupaten is district, in this paper dis- 
trict stands for kecamatan) and 98 cities (kota) (MoHA, 2015). 
Granted as autonomous areas, provinces and regencies/cities have 
local government systems with local elected head and represen- 
tative councils. In general, a regency and city in Indonesia are 
differentiated by a couple of characteristics. A city is in an urban 
area (some coincide as a province’s capital city) and regency is in 
a rural area. In addition, a city and regency in Indonesia differs 
in area size: a regency is always bigger than a city. 
Before explaining the foundation of the Indonesian village 
governance system, a very brief Southeast Asia village governance 
comparison is important to recognise. Marx & Ghosh (2014) 
present an example of village governance comparison. First, Cam- 
bodia has around 14,000 villages and it is located under the com- 
mune/sangkat. Commune is located in the district and sangkat is 
under the khan. The district is located in province and khan is 
located in the municipality. The village is a legal entity but not 
an official government administration. Village chief is appointed 
by the commune council. The village chief has twin roles. First, 
as a community leader, village chief accommodates and facili- 
tates of handling disputes and issues that arise in his/her village. 
The second role as the representative of the government, village 
chief prioritizes government project placement in the village and 
supervise the implementation. Also, village chief is the contact 
for villagers to the government. For remuneration, village chiefs 
receive financial support only from the government. All in all, 
village government is limited, since Cambodia’s decentralisation 
policy has been currently expanded until commune level. 
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Marx & Ghosh for the second case presented the Philippines. 
This country divides its area into provinces and Highly Urban- 
ized Cities. Under the provinces are the cities and municipali- 
ties then under municipalities is the barangay as the bottom level 
of government unit. There are 42,028 barangays that are catego- 
rized as a village. Commune is the lowest level of government in 
Cambodia, while in the Philippines is the barangay. Barangay 
considers as an autonomous local government unit and under it 
are the neighbourhoods named sitios or puroks. The chief execu- 
tive of parangay is the punong barangay and the legislative council 
is the sangguniang barangay that is elected every 3 years. Different 
with other countries, the barangay has judicial body named 
katarungang pambarangay, it is a community-based mechanism for 
speedy resolution of disputes among community members. 
Barangay is authorized to raise its own revenues; however, barangays 
is still highly dependable on a formula share government fiscal 
transfer the internal revenue allotment (IRA). Barangays can prac- 
tice discretion in IRA utilisation rather than specific purpose 
direct grants. 
Another case of village is from a developed country like Ja- 
pan that has two layers of local government. First layer is the 
prefectures (-to/ -do/ -fu/ -ken) and the second layer is the munici- 
palities namely city (-shi), town (-cho or -–machi), and village (- 
mura or -son). Since village is considered as a municipality, it means 
village is a local administrative unit that stands equal to (not 
under) city and town. The different is only the population and 
area size of village is the smallest than other municipalities. Vil- 
lage mayor is the executive organ and village assembly is the leg- 
islative organ both have the term length of four years and they 
are directly elected by the residents. Japan tried to promote 
decentralisation by abolishing agency delegated function to lo- 
cal government in the year 2000 (Konishi, 2010). Japan is facing 
aging society and high fiscal burden with an outstanding inter- 
nal debt. Thus, coincide with the promotion of decentralisation, 
Japan has implemented the wide-area administration (see 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yokomichi, 2010) and municipal merger policy. As a result, the 
number of villages continuously decreasing like in the event of 
Great Showa Consolidation (1953-1960) from 7,616 villages to 
981 villages and in the Great Heisei Consolidation (1999-2006) 
from 568 to 198. Moreover, a sign of the society transition from 
rural to urban is shown by the increase of a number of cities 
from 671 to 777 in the year 1999-2006 (see Yokomichi, 2007). In 
the fiscal side, the central government tried to reduce the gen- 
eral fiscal transfer for local governments called the Local Alloca- 
tion Tax (LAT) in the case of Trinity Reform (2003-2006), the 
purpose is to increase local fiscal independence and improve 
central fiscal health (Ikawa, 2007). 
Indonesia’s villages are located under the regencies and coor- 
dinated by districts (kecamatan) as the representation of regency 
government. Village head as the village chief executive with the 
term length of 6 years and the legislative organisation is the vil- 
lage council Badan Permusyawaratan Desa (BPD) with the term 
length of 5 years. Units under the village are community unit or 
rukun warga (RW) and neighbourhood unit or rukun tetangga (RT). 
An Indonesian village is called desa. According to Village Law 
2014, there are two kinds of villages: desa, or administrative vil- 
lages, and desa adat, or customary villages. In this study, we dis- 
cuss desa without desa adat. This consideration is due to the num- 
ber of administrative villages exceeding the number of custom- 
ary villages. Only in some parts of Indonesia do customary vil- 
lages remain. No customary villages are included in this case 
study. 
Different from the governance at higher levels, village gover- 
nance employs a hybrid system combining self-governing com- 
munity with local self-government (Marx & Ghosh, 2014) 
(Silahudin, 2015) (MoHA, 2015). As a self-governing community, 
the village is formed as community organisation. The village is 
viewed as an independent entity whose traditions are drawn 
purely from the community. Villages are established by the com- 
munity, arranged by the community, performed by the commu- 
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nity, and function for the collective purpose or interest of the 
community. The empirical interpretation of this system is that 
all the village government apparatus must come from their own 
people. Villages also have the right to draft their own legislation 
based on local traditions, as long as it does not contradict with 
higher regulations (Antlov, Wetterberg, & Dharmawan, 2016) 
As a local self-government, villages also constitute as government 
organisation. Dual interpretation about village’s position in 
Indonesia’s governance system. The Local Government Law 23/ 
2014 states regency/city divided into districts, and further dis- 
tricts divided into villages and sub-districts (kelurahan), this means 
a village is a division unit of a regency and is the lowest and 
closest representative body of the people. The state and local 
government could assign responsibilities to village. Therefore, 
village government is accountable for the assigned responsibili- 
ties to the regency via district government. Village Law 2014 states 
that a village stands independently as a government entity that 
administers their own tasks and necessities to provide public ser- 
vices. It is the smallest organisation that has a certain degree of 
autonomy (MoHA, 2015). 
Unlike the previous decentralisation of state/central govern- 
ment to local government, which included transfer of authori- 
ties and residual principles, decentralisation to a village employs 
two keystone principles: recognition and subsidiarity (Silahudin, 
2015, p. 11). Recognition stands for acknowledging and honouring 
a village’s existence based on its origin and traditional right. 
Recognition emerges due to the preservation of villages plural- 
ism (especially in a customary villages) whose coexistence is older 
than the republic of Indonesia (Eko, 2015, p. 39). Indonesian 
villages operate under a variation of governing models; for ex- 
ample in term of appellation of village: Nagari in West Sumatera, 
Gampong in Aceh, Pakraman in Bali, Marga in South Sumatera, 
etc. Although in some areas customary villages have vanished, to 
a certain degree, their customs still exist in administrative vil- 
lages. For instance, village heads are referred to as Pambakal in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banjar, Kuwu in Cirebon, Lurah in Yogyakarta, etc. In the con- 
text of administrative law, villages are recognised as self-govern- 
ing communities, as social entities permitted to run their own 
government as a legal community entity. Provinces, regencies, 
and cities are also legal community entities, allowed to perform 
local governance and named autonomous areas. In contrast, vil- 
lages are not considered autonomous areas but in practice has 
special privileges to run their own system of governance or a 
certain degree of autonomy. Markell (2008) understands recog- 
nition as granting an entity the capability to act on its own rather 
than based on an identity. This recognition principle has brought 
the consequence that village have its own responsibilities. In or- 
der to operates the responsibilities, the nation supported by the 
allocation of the new transfer Dana Desa from the state level 
exclusively for villages in addition to the regular consequences 
from the regency-level Alokasi Dana Desa (Eko, 2015, p. 41). 
Subsidiarity is the principle that power should be decentralised 
wherever possible (Begg et al., 1993) and that decisions should 
be made at the lowest possible effective level (Holmes, 2004). 
Proponents of subsidiarity believe that the village and impacted 
societies in general identify local problems more clearly and logi- 
cally know better how to solve it. Therefore, issues can be solved 
more effectively and efficiently by the village than by a higher 
party. Consequently, the state stipulates that any authority that 
the village is capable of exercising shall not be undermined or 
transferred to outside authorities or to higher government tiers. 
Colombo (2012) expressed that subsidiarity is a principle for regu- 
lating the distribution of public powers, endowing local struc- 
tures with the autonomy and the resources necessary to carry 
out their responsibilities. The application of subsidiarity in In- 
donesian villages is the existence of Kewenangan Lokal Berskala 
Desa, or village-scale authorities (Eko, 2015, p. 114), which clus- 
ter their own authority in 1) village governance activities, 2) vil- 
lage development (infrastructure), 3) social services (relations), 
and 4) community  empowerment. In  order to operate the vil- 
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lage-scale authorities, village is given revenues from the follow- 
ing sources: 1) original village revenue, 2) allocation from na- 
tional budget, 3) revenue sharing from regency taxes, 4) alloca- 
tion from fiscal balance fund for regency, 5) financial aid from 
third parties, and 6) other legitimate revenue sources. 
 
CASE STUDY PROFILE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Banjar Regency is one of thirteen regencies/cities in the South 
Kalimantan Province positioned at the southeast side of Borneo 
Island and comprises 20 districts, 277 villages and 13 sub-dis- 
tricts. The regency spans 4,706.05 km2 and as of 2014 had a 
population of 547,862. The economic structure of Banjar Re- 
gency is dominated by four sectors: trade, agriculture, mining 
and the service industry (Banjar, 2014). Because most of the data 
used in this study was not available on the internet, the author 
collected data from the Community Empowerment and Village 
Governance Agency (Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan 
Pemerintahan Desa Kabupaten Banjar/BPMPD) and attended some 
internal meetings with regency and district officials and village 
heads in February-March of 2016, during which time survey and 
interviews were conducted. The author also visited the BPMPD 
South Kalimantan Province in Banjarbaru and three ministries 
in Jakarta (i.e., the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA); the Min- 
istry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and 
Transmigration (MoV); and Ministry of Finance (MoF)) for in- 
terviews and synchronise information about the village. 
Although interviews  are held at village, regency, provincial, 
and ministerial level, the main qualitative data are from infor- 
mants: BPMPD head, village governance division head at BPMPD 
and regency level village facilitator (pendamping desa). The inter- 
action with 66 village heads via open survey and some with un- 
structured interviews to explore how the village fiscal transfers 
policy implemented. For quantitative data, for allocation part 
the author used the village fiscal transfers allocation for villages 
in Banjar Regency namely village fund (Dana Desa/DD) Fiscal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year (FY) 2015 and 2016, village fund regency allocation (Alokasi 
Dana Desa/ADD) and shared regency tax revenues (Bagi Hasil 
Pajak Daerah dan Retribusi Daerah/BHPRD) from FY2011 to 2016. 
For expenditures part the data used are total regency level village 
budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Desa/APBDes) FY2014, 
samples of 98 villages’ budget FY2015, and villages’ report of 
village fiscal transfers realisation FY2015. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
VILLAGE’S INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS 
The milestone interpretation of Village Law is the DD. The 
government promised that the fund would increase every year 
until the slogan “one village one billion” (satu desa satu milyar) 
was actualised. Previously, the only village intergovernmental fis- 
cal relations were between the regency and village through ADD 
and BHPRD. Subsequently, state-village fiscal relations were de- 
veloped through the village fund, in addition to the prior re- 
gency-village fiscal relations. 
 
TABLE 1. TOTAL BANJAR REGENCY VILLAGE REVENUES (IN RP. BILLION) 
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No. FY DD ADD BHPRD 
 
 
Total Village 
Revenues 
 
Average 
Received 
per Village 
 
Annual 
Change of 
Total Village 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BPMPD Banjar 
 
The figures from Banjar Regency show progressive changes 
regarding allocation for villages. In FY 2015, the allocation was 
nearly four times that of the year before. DD is the dominant 
transfer for villages than the other financial resources from the 
regency. The average funds received per village grew almost ten- 
fold, from an average of 100 million per year to about 950 mil- 
 (in Rp. 
million) 
Revenues 
(%) 
1. 2011 - 34.375 3 37.375 134.9 NA 
２. 2012 - 32.683 3 35.683 128.8 -4.5 
３. 2013 - 32.600 3 35.600 128.5 -0.2 
４. 2014 - 35.609 3 38.609 139.3 8.4 
５. 2015 73.258 99.247 3 175.505 633.6 354 
６. 2016 164.329 97.904 3 265.233 957.5 51 
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lion in 2016. Moreover, with the character of the village fiscal 
transfers as a general purpose transfer that tend to be uncondi- 
tional transfer and the village government in utilizing has a par- 
ticular discretionary or freedom degree of spending. Therefore, 
this growth opened new challenges for all parties—not only the 
village but also the state and local government must guide the 
implementer to the real purpose of the transfers. Next, the au- 
thor explains three types of village fiscal transfers: 
 
VILLAGE FUND (DANA DESA) 
Allocated from the national budget (APBN), DD’s minimum 
value is 10% from the value of all fiscal transfers for local govern- 
ments, but the DD allocation is outside not included in the fis- 
cal transfers for local governments. In fact, the allocation is still 
below 10% but increased from Rp. 20.76 Trillion or 3.1% in 
2015 to Rp. 46.9 Trillion or 6.4% in 2016. The distribution 
mechanism starts when MoF transfers DD to the regency, and 
the regency then distributes DD to the villages. MoF has the 
jurisdiction to determine the DD allocation formula for regen- 
cies. Likewise, regencies are tasked with calculating the DD allo- 
cation formula for villages. 
Lewis (2015) had examined the formula and criticised that, 
oddly, the DD allocation mechanism predominantly exercises 
equal measures per village, disregarding the villages’ disparities 
and ignoring other sources of revenue for villages. Unequal dis- 
tribution of DD and other transfers could result. 
DD = [0.9 ∗ (
DDT ) ∗ V ] + [0.1 ∗ DD ∗ (∑ 
∝ℎ .PROXY ℎ i )] (1) 
i VT
 i T ℎ PROXY ℎ T 
Equation source: Lewis (2015) 
 
The formula shows 90%  for regencies divided equally 
per village. The remaining 10% of is distributed based on the 
weight of variables according to equation (1). Continuing Lewis’s 
(2015) equation, for this paper is DD allocation for regency i, 
while is total village funds nationally. is the total number of In- 
donesian villages, is the total number of villages in regency i. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
represents DD proxies in regency i, where h covers the following 
variables: village population, village poor people number, village 
area size, and the geographical difficulty index with the weights 
25%, 35%, 10%, and 30%. represent those proxies’ weights, 
which add up to one. is the sum value (i.e., across all regencies in 
Indonesia) of PROXY h. 
At the regency level, the allocation for every village goes like 
equation (2) below. is DD allocation for village d. represents DD 
proxies in village d. The weights of every variable or have the 
same percentage as in the state-to-regency allocation formula. 
90% of is split samely and 10% is divided based on the proxies’ 
weight of villages or proportioned formula amount. 
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DD   =  [0.9 ∗ (
DDi )] + [0.1 ∗ DD  ∗ (∑  
∝ℎ .PROXY ℎ d )] (2) 
d Vi i ℎ PROXY ℎ i 
base amount proportioned formula amount 
 
VILLAGE FUND REGENCY ALLOCATION (ALOKASI DAN A 
DESA) 
The previous law, government regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) 
GR 72/2005, had stipulated that ADD came from 10% of the 
fiscal balancing fund after deducting regency apparatus spend- 
ing. The fiscal balancing fund comprises general grant (Dana 
Alokasi Umum) and shared revenues from tax and natural re- 
sources (Bagi Hasil Pajak dan Sumber Daya Alam). The 2014 Vil- 
lage Law changed the ADD’s determination from 10% of the 
fiscal balancing fund without deducting regency apparatus spend- 
ing. As a result, ADD hiked from Rp. 35 billion for 2014 to Rp. 
99 billion for 2015 and 2016. 
In 2015, Banjar Regency changed ADD allocation from an 
even distribution to a partial formula based method, which con- 
sists of 60% of the base amount and 40% of the proportioned 
formula amount. and are the village fund regency allocations for 
village d and total in regency i, respectively. represents ADD prox- 
ies in village d and is the total value of in Banjar Regency. r = 
village population, village poverty number, village size, village 
 ADDi ∑ þr .PROXY rd 
Vi PROXY ri 
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government wage, geographical difficulty index with the weights 
for FY 2016 (35%, 7.5%, 7.5%, 35%, and 15%, respectively. The 
equation is below: 
 
ADDd  =  [0.6 ∗ ( )] + [0.4 ∗ ADDi  ∗ (  r )] (3) 
 
  
base amount proportioned formula amount 
 
SHARED REGENCY TAX REVENUES (BAGI HASIL PAJAK 
DAERAH DAN RETRIBUSI DAERAH) 
The regency has to give 10% of its tax revenue to the villages, 
and the regency government seemed to not pay attention to the 
escalation of regency tax revenues for the development of BPHRD 
allocation. In 2013, 2014, and 2015, regency tax revenues (Pajak 
& Retribusi Daerah) increased to Rp. 51.7 billion, Rp. 66 billion, 
and Rp. 54.2 billion (DISPENDA Banjar, 2015), respectively. 
However, each year the BPHRD allocation remained constant at 
Rp. 3 billion. 
Similar to the ADD distribution method, the BPHRD alloca- 
tion method has changed from an even distribution method to a 
formula-based method, with 60% of the base amount and 40% 
of the proportioned formula amount. and are the amounts of 
village fund regency allocation for village d and the total in re- 
gency i, respectively. Due to the limited data of regency tax rev- 
enues collected in each village, the regency government decided 
to use the data from the land property tax collected from each 
village to use as, which represents BPHRD proxies in village d 
and is the total value of in regency i. r = village population, prop- 
erty tax target, property tax realisation, property tax quittance 
degree with the weights for FY2016 (30%, 30%, 20%, and 20%, 
respectively. BPHRD allocation method as shown below: 
 
BPHRD = [0.6 ∗ (
BPHRD i )] + [0.4 ∗ BPHRD ∗ (∑ 
yp .PROXY pd 
)] (4) 
d Vi i p    PROXY p i 
base amount proportioned formula amount 
  
ASSESSING VILLAGE FISCAL TRANSFERS: EQUALITY AND 
FISCAL CAPACITY METHOD 
The three transfers are merged into the APBDes, unlike DD, 
which has legal direction from government regulation PP 22/ 
2015 to determine the percentage of the base/same amount per 
village 90% and the remaining 10% with determining weight of 
variables or proportioned formula amount. For ADD, the re- 
gency improvised the establishment of the base amount. Ideally, 
regarding to equity and fairness the base amount should not 
exist because it will weaken the objective allocation based on the 
real situation of villages so it should be formula only for alloca- 
tion of village fiscal transfers. For instance, village with bigger 
size area should receive more village fiscal transfers than the 
smaller one since they must be having bigger scope of responsi- 
bilities than the smaller one or villages with high number of 
poor people should receive more fiscal transfers than villages 
with low number of poor people because the more one village 
have poor people the more they need funding for poverty allevia- 
tion programs. The present of base amount only making the 
distribution of fiscal transfers more not objective to villages’ situ- 
ation. This part examines the policy why the government imple- 
mented the base amount allocation. The approach for examines 
the base amount allocation using the village fiscal transfers allo- 
cation per village and per capita per village. 
Firstly, the author operates the Banjar Regency village fiscal 
transfers allocation for FY 2016 using the equation (2), (3), and 
(4) above and united those transfers into village budget and de- 
termine it as “actual allocation” (the base amount with the pro- 
portioned formulated amount). Secondly, running another allo- 
cation simulation by removing the base amount so it is using 
proportioned formula only and named as “non-base amount al- 
location simulation”. The result can be seen in Figure 1 and it 
seems fairer. The gap among the villages in the actual simulation 
is not as wide as the non-base amount simulation. If we use the 
concept of Musgrave and Musgrave (1989, p. 455) that every citi- 
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zen should receive same public service cost, a further simulation 
can be conducted with the per capita (PC) allocation approach. 
The result is that the PC non-base amount allocation is more 
equal than the PC actual allocation, but the gap is very close and 
relatively could be ignored, see Figure 2. Lastly, the author uses 
the Gini coefficient for measuring the inequality where the coef- 
ficient values from 0=perfect equality 1=perfect inequality (see 
Kakwani & Son, 2005). The calculation of Gini coefficient for 
the PC non-base amount allocation is 0.28, and the PC actual 
allocation is 0.30. This is a very positive result from the alloca- 
tion method implemented by the regency, compared to the state’s 
method, which divided DD FY2015 across regencies, yielding a 
Gini coefficient of 1.19 (see Lewis, 2015). 
 
TABLE 2.DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND VARIATION OF VILLAGE FISCAL TRANSFERS FY 2016 (IN RP.)  
Mean Min. Max. Variation Coef. Gini Coef. 
(in 
PC 
(in 
PC (in million) PC PC 
Base w/
 
Non-Base, 
 
 
 
 
Source: BPMPD Banjar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. VILLAGE BUDGET SIMULATION 
 
Source: Author’s own simulation Population of 277 villages (1 to 277 are villages’ serial number)  
 million) million)      Formula only Formula 
DD 593.2 569,289 575.7 82,708 678.4 2,062,671 0.02 0.64 0.33 0.31 
ADD 353.4 323,776 293.2 76,460 601.2 1,116,465 0.13 0.58 0.30 0.43 
BPHRD 10.8 9,278 6.8 1,964 122.4 108,601 1.02 0.93 0.33 0.25 
APBDes 957.5 902,343 878.3 168,829 1,282.9 3,203,021 0.06 0.61 0.30 0.28 
 
  
 
FIGURE 2. PER CAPITA VILLAGE BUDGET SIMULATION 
 
 
Source: Author’s own simulation Population of 277 villages (1 to 277 are villages’ serial number) 
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Table 2 shows DD from the state comprises about 62% of 
village revenues on average and the remaining comes from re- 
gency ADD and BPHRD. The smallest amount of DD received 
by villages is 575.7 million and the highest is 678.4 million, but 
in PC the interval is very large: the largest village received more 
than 20 times the DD received by the smallest. Having said that, 
the regency government divided the transfers better than the state. 
The PC ADD maximum is about 10 times the ADD minimum 
amount. BPHRD’s value is based on property tax, which can be 
very dramatic, as the achievement for villages located near urban 
areas or the outskirts is much higher than that of villages in more 
remote areas. Due to this, the PC BPHRD varies dramatically 
among villages. Banjar Regency levied 39 tax bases (13 taxes, 26 
fees) (DISPENDA Banjar, 2015); thus, in the future, BPHRD 
allocation should be more objective using more than one base 
tax parameter achievement per village. 
Weight is a factor in the transfers system and a standard set- 
ting (Spahn, 2007, p. 175). Therefore, presumably the village 
budget non-base amount allocation simulation that determined 
allocation of every village fiscal transfer by weight of variables is 
a suitable fiscal design for village transfers. However in reality, 
the village budget actual allocation uses the base amount for a 
win-win situation so that one village to another would have not 
a severe wide gap of village budget (see Figure 1). Further, if the 
amount of village budget actual allocation minuses the amount 
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of village budget non-base amount simulation, we can see vil- 
lages that lose or win the fiscal transfers. The result can be seen 
in Figure 3 (left/- for loser and right/+ for winner) that shows 
districts that have more villages with a larger size, larger popula- 
tion, and poorer population like Aluh-Aluh and Sungai Tabuk most 
suffered, and Paramasan, which comprises only four villages but 
is large in size, lose as well. In contrast, districts such as Karang 
Intan, Simpang Empat, and Tatah Makmur that have many villages 
with small in size with small populations benefit from this base 
amount decision. 
 
FIGURE 3. VILLAGE BUDGET ALLOCATION LOSER AND WINNERS (GROUPED BY DISTRICT)  
 
 
*Simpang Empat represents two districts: Simpang Empat itself and Cintapuri Darussalam Source: Author’s own 
simulation 
 
Fiscal capacity is the sum of the local government own rev- 
enues plus shared revenues (Kassum, 2003). MOF’s through regu- 
lation No.37/PMK.07/2016 defines fiscal capacity as general 
description of local government financial capability. Fiscal ca- 
pacity is obtained from general revenues that comprises of own 
revenues and transfers from other level of governments excludes 
special purpose transfers and then minuses with the officials’ 
expenditures then divided with population of poor people. Modi- 
fied from the above definition, this paper defines village fiscal 
capacity as the sum of village revenues minus the village govern- 
ment officials’ wages divided by the village population as de- 
scribed in equation (5). The villages’ own revenues do not con- 
  
tribute to village fiscal capacity because there is no available data, 
and in general, villages in Banjar do not have their own revenue, 
only very few villages that have its own revenue and with unsub- 
stantial amount of revenue. 
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FCd = 
(DDd +ADDd +BPHRD d )−WGd 
POPd 
(5) IFCd =
  FCd (6)    
(∑d FC/Vi ) 
 
FCd is fiscal capacity in village d, WGd is wage for village d 
government officials, and POPd is the village d population. Fiscal 
capacity or IFCd is indexed using equation (6) with the value 
categories ‘Low’ (<0.5), (1>>0.5) ‘Medium’, and ‘High’ (>1) yields 
villages’ fiscal capacity mapping as shown below: 
 
FIGURE 4.VILLAGES’ FISCAL CAPACITY MAPPING (IN UNIT) FIGURE 5.VILLAGES’ FISCAL PERFORMANCE (IN UNIT) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
The bar chart shows that the villages’ fiscal capacity improved 
from 2015 to 2016. Only 15% villages have low fiscal capacity. 
The positive shift is in low fiscal capacity, from 52 to 40 villages, 
and the medium-level fiscal capacity had increased from 123 to 
134 villages. This indicates that the regency allocation method 
succeeded relatively in dividing the transfers to the villages. 
A short open survey was conducted with a sample of 66 vil- 
lage heads, collecting their perceptions of the huge increase of 
village fiscal transfers. The results were that 36% of village heads 
think that the increase has created sufficient resources for the 
villages, 48% still think that the resources are not enough for 
village need, and only 3% argued that the increase is too exces- 
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sive to handle by village. In response to a question regarding the 
need to create village own revenue after receiving “easy-uncondi- 
tional transfers” from the government, 77% said village own rev- 
enue still needed to be created, and only 3% said there was no 
need to create village own revenue. 
 
CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ALLOCATION METHOD 
Fiscal sufficiency—the 30-70 uniformity. The state provides fiscal 
transfers to local governments in order to achieve greater unifor- 
mity of expenditures (Wildasin, 2006). Making the villages work 
with sufficient fiscal support is the main concern for the regency 
government. The government determines the village local-scale 
authorities for the basic references for utilising the transfers. The 
allocation plays as the strategy to create 30-70 uniformity that 
the village budget contains 30% for wages and village govern- 
ment operations/routines and 70% for village local-scale authori- 
ties (Zainuddin, 2016) and (Rahman, 2016), which include: 1) 
village governance activities, 2) village development (infrastruc- 
ture), 3) social services (relations), and 4) community empower- 
ment. In addition, the regency government determines the sal- 
ary of every village official. In FY2015, the average percentage 
wage in the village budget is 23%, with a maximum value of 
26%, and in FY2016 the average increased to 24% but the maxi- 
mum value was 34%. There are 11 villages that have wage expen- 
ditures at and over 30%. There is no budget left for government 
routine for those villages because of remuneration allocation. 
Maintaining state-regency-village relations. The state wants DD 
as a reflection of original political support from the state for all 
villages. The regency does not interfere with the DD’s allocation 
method of 90% equal per village and 10% based on the weights 
of all the determinant variables except for the design of ADD 
and BPHRD the weight of variables determined by regency it- 
self, which is originally the regency’s jurisdiction. All in all, the 
allocation satisfied the villages with minimum objections or com- 
plaints (Zainuddin, 2016). Avoidance of jealousy of resources 
  
distribution among villages was prioritised (Rahman, 2016). Shah 
and Broadway (2007) explained that transfers comprise an 
equalising element in which higher per capita transfers go to low 
fiscal capacities jurisdictions. In this case, horizontal equality 
(among villages) and vertical equality (state-regency-village rela- 
tions) can be achieved based on the fiscal capacity index perspec- 
tive. Moreover, the relations between state-village and regency- 
village is very important, because it reflects the relations of the 
state with its people, as the village is the closest entity to the 
people. Developing and administering the country with full fi- 
nancial commitment is a sign that the government is open to 
involvement from members of society. Endearing themselves to 
the society could be quite beneficial for current local and na- 
tional leaders and politicians. 
 
AFTER SPENDING 
Infrastructure Development and Remuneration Dominate 
High allocation comes with high responsibilities. Based on 
the four domains of village local-scale authorities, the emerging 
trend for the first-year implementation (see Figure 6) is expendi- 
ture on the development of infrastructure in the first place and 
then followed by governance activities. Before the new transfers, 
the highest spending was on wage only, but other spending such 
as governance operational and community empowerment and 
development (in one account) is covered in very small amounts 
that are equal in all villages, Rp. 30.8 million and Rp. 20 mil- 
lion, respectively. 
The four domains of expenditure have their own roles in de- 
veloping a village. The position of the expenditures also has its 
own importance. However, in terms of its implementation, it 
seems that infrastructure is prioritised. The imbalance of spend- 
ing is very big between development and governance activities, 
at Rp. 334 million and Rp. 200 million, respectively, with social 
services and community empowerment spending as the two small- 
est expenditures at Rp. 51 million and Rp. 33 million, respec- 
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tively. The gap had reached more than 20 times from the lowest 
to the highest spending. Summing up, infrastructure develop- 
ment and remuneration are the main trends. 
FIGURE 6.VILLAGES EXPENDITURE TREND BEFORE AND AFTER THE NEW FISCAL TRANSFERS 
 
 
Source: BPMPD Banjar 
 
 
Examples of infrastructure development include neighbour- 
hood roads, agriculture access roads, roads’ drain, small bridges, 
street gutters, security posts, public toilets, and clean water pipes. 
Governance activities also include infrastructure projects such 
as renovating the village head’s office, building midwife houses, 
and building a village hall. Other governance activities include 
improvement of things like computers, furniture, ambulances, 
and other supporting materials. Social services (relations) such 
as financial aid for mosques, providing fire extinguishers, chairs 
and tents for community events. Community empowerment 
comes in the form of training and capacity building for commu- 
nity organisations to improve skills that support the village’s eco- 
nomic improvement. 
Dunleavy’s rationalises (1991) that larger budgets help bureau- 
crats raise salaries, since increased responsibilities merit higher 
remuneration. The statement above can be found in this study, 
the sense of high responsibilities encountered by the regency 
government by improving the village government’s salary, allow- 
ance, and/or incentives (Marx & Ghosh, 2014) with the pur- 
pose of motivating village government employees. All village gov- 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ernment employees originally have another profession, for ex- 
ample teacher, farmer, bricklayer, household industry owner, etc. 
With remuneration, it is hoped that they can fully responsible 
to work for the village government without needing extra income 
from jobs outside village administration. Starting in 2015, a vil- 
lage government treasurer, or Bendahara, was recruited and paid. 
Then, in 2016, villages that do not have a secretary, or Sekretaris 
Desa, recruited for the position. Before 2016, only three persons 
were allocated for neighbourhood heads, or Kepala Lingkungan 
or Ketua Rukun Tetangga/RT, but currently an allowance of up to 
nine persons is in place. Before the transfers, the village head 
paid Rp. 2 million/month, but the payment increased to Rp.3 
millions/month after the present of village fiscal transfers. Other 
officials like division heads, or Kepala Urusan, neighbourhood 
heads, and village treasurers earned under Rp. 1 million/month 
but are now paid Rp. 1.33 million, Rp. 1.33 million, and Rp.1.24 
million/month, respectively. For BPD members, were previously 
paid under Rp. 500,000/month and are now paid under Rp. 
700,000/month, depending on the chairmanship. The new po- 
sition of village secretary paid far better than other village offi- 
cials, in the amount of Rp. 1.76 million/month. 
 
New Mindset for Village Heads 
Village Law defined village government as the village head 
assisted by village officials obligated to enact village governance, 
execute village development, maintain village social relations, 
and empower the community. These terms are very serious, as 
they are not easy job to carry out. A political position that func- 
tioned as the territorial head (warden) made the village head 
figures strong and important in society, as a good public servant 
for the people and as a government facilitator in delivering gov- 
ernment projects in the village. They bear twenty-four-hour re- 
sponsibilities due to the commitment to helping the people 
whenever they need it. This is the basic task of the village head. 
Regarding the new fiscal policy, village financial management 
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authority is held by the village head. The task developed with 
the demand that the village head have public finance manage- 
ment skills. High resources demand greater involvement of the 
village head in financial management. The village head is in- 
volved in the phases of public finance management coordinat- 
ing from planning, budgeting, expenditure/procurement, ac- 
counting, reporting, and performance evaluation/assessment. 
Nevertheless, participation from the society is fundamental in 
the process of managing public funds at the village level. 
Village heads have to start learning the skills and developing 
the right mindset to manage public organisation and its finan- 
cial resources. This action aimed to carry out the Village Law by 
developing the villages and improving their economies. Lack of 
competence might lead to mismanagement, which may possibly 
create losses of public funds that may in turn be seen as corrup- 
tion. On the whole, village heads have added to their responsi- 
bilities to include public finance manager. 
 
Forgetting Two-Way Accountability 
While it is relatively true that spending money is an easy job, 
for public provision the accounting and reporting are difficult. 
In Indonesian governance, spending public allocation is com- 
monly defined as fiscal performance. The standard village fiscal 
performance is assigned by the government. The villages have to 
spend a minimum of 70% of its budget. As seen in Figure 5, 
only 50 villages could not reach the target of a 70% minimum 
(under achievement). 98 villages achieved 70% but spent under 
90% (minimum achievement). On a positive note, 150 villages 
spent more than 90% (high achievement). Those numbers are a 
good prospective sign for first-time implementation despite the 
gap between overall village budget realisation and the actual bud- 
get in Figure 7. 
On the other hand, accounting and reporting need improve- 
ment. Completion of accounting and reporting for 2015 village 
transfers spending that had been submitted to the regency gov- 
  
ernment is below 100% (see Figure 8), even though the account- 
ing and reporting are mandatory to be 100% submitted. Village 
governments are fighting hard to make the report achieve up- 
ward accountability. The FY is 1 January to 31 December and 
one month after the FY ended is given to publish the report. In 
fact, the regency had waited for more than three months to con- 
solidate the reports from all villages. Moreover, the villages had 
only delivered the report to their superior and forgot that the 
report is also essential for the village government and so must be 
publicly published for downward accountability to the society. 
As Clarke and Stewart (1991) argued that local authority is more 
accountable to the superior than to the community. 
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FIGURE 7. VILLAGE BUDGET REALISATION FY 2015 FIGURE 8.VILLAGE BUDGET REPORT ACCOMPLISH- 
MENT FY 2015 
Source: BPMPD Banjar 
 
 
Fading Political Competition for Village Projects 
Before the new village fiscal transfers were given, projects were 
not received every year or by every village from the regency gov- 
ernment or even from the province and ministries. Villages have 
to compete with one another for projects. Village heads have to 
be proactive in creating high initiatives for delivering people’s 
messages to local politicians, local officers, and ministry repre- 
sentatives to advocate for receiving projects. However, now that 
the motive of the transfers’ establishment is to consolidate all 
government programmes into one medium especially Program 
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Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri/PNPM was replaced 
with DD for villages, each village can have their own projects 
with their own preferences with equal opportunities as other 
villages. 
Not all programmes for villages have vanished; the govern- 
ment still executes programmes to maintain its function in pub- 
lic provision and social welfare. Villages still need to convey their 
messages and, if necessary, doing the bargaining to make sure 
they receive the projects. Recently, the competition seems to have 
become less fierce. Some village heads (as an example Three vil- 
lage heads from Teluk Selong (Martapura Barat), Lok Buntar (Sungai 
Tabuk), Bawahan Selan (Mataraman) found themselves no longer 
motivated to take a political approach in obtaining regency 
projects, and want to do the projects on their own. This is be- 
cause it is tiring to “beg” without being sure of the outcome and 
to hand over the projects to outside parties that possibly have 
different interests in the village. 
 
Overlapping Authorities 
It can be said that the policy was forced to run rushly. Village 
Law is composed of government regulations, but at the local level 
it is still concerned with the progress of socialisation and learn- 
ing rules, not yet reaching the phase of making regency-level regu- 
lations in response to meeting regulations with technical points; 
still, the FY 2015 goes on, time runs out, and implementation 
needs to be initiated (see Table 3). Thus, accidents in the waiting 
occurred. Unclear separation of village local-scale authorities and 
regency authorities creates overlapping authorities in projects 
(Zainah, 2016). This arose because the local regulations for stipu- 
lating the local-scale village authorities were not yet finished. The 
villages only have the more general directions from GR and 
Peraturan Menteri/Permen (Ministry Regulation). Litvack et al. 
(1999) states that it is important to have clear expenditure re- 
sponsibilities in order to reduce the occurrence of duplication 
of authority. 
  
TABLE 3. THE PROCESS OF THE FIRST IMPLEMENTATION OF VILLAGE FISCAL TRANSFERS POLICY 
 
Semester I, 2014 Village Law 6/2014 stipulation and socialisation to local 
governments; 
Semester II Government Regulation 43/2014 the Operational 
Regulation of Village Law & Government Regulation 
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60/2014 Village Fund from National Budget stipulation    
and socialisation to local governments; 
  
January, 2015 MoHA Regulation 113/2014 Village Finance and MoHA 
Regulation 114/2014 Village Development was stipulated; 
February DD, ADD, BPHRD allocation by the regency government; 
MoV Regulation 1/2015 Guidelines for Village Origin 
Authority and Village Local Scale Authorities, MoV 
Regulation 5/2015 The Priority of DD Utilisation 
stipulation; 
  
March The new village budget APBDes first implementation with 
the design of 30% village government routine and 70% 
village local scale authorities’ expenditure; 
  
April Change of DD allocation formula 90% evenly and 10% 
formula based allocation; 
  
May-August APBDes realisation from ADD & BPHRD, Revision of DD 
allocation thus revision of APBDes, Regulation 
socialisation and training of village finance to villages; 
  
September APBDes realisation, 1st term of DD realisation; 
 
October-November APBDes realisation, 2ndt term of DD realisation; 
 
December APBDes realisation, 3rd term of DD realisation. 
 
 
Source: Interview with Rahman (2016) from BPMPD Kabupaten Banjar. 
 
 
The overlapping incidents happened in development (infra- 
structure) authority: with examples the village built gutters/drain- 
age in the regency (across district) road, it is clear that regency 
road infrastructure is within the regency’s jurisdiction 
unexceptionally the drainage is also regency’s responsibility. In- 
frastructure support for kindergarten (Taman Kanak-Kanak) is 
the regency’s job, but support for pre-kindergarten or play groups, 
or Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini/PAUD, is the village’s responsibil- 
ity. For the domain of social services (relations) authority, sup- 
port for Masjid (big size) mosques is still controversial with re- 
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spect to whether villages are allowed to do it. Regarding gover- 
nance activities authority, village offices are regency assets. It is 
still uncertain whether villages assume the responsibility of reno- 
vating the offices. In addition, there is no green light from the 
regency for villages to purchase land for infrastructure projects, 
as the regulation is unclear. 
 
LIMITATIONSAND OPPORTUNITIES 
Limitations in Human Resources. In the village fiscal transfers 
case, the human resources needed comprise of two types of ex- 
perts: public finance professionals and public works profession- 
als. To be specific, public finance (administration) shortages cov- 
ers annual and mid-term planning, budgeting, accounting/finan- 
cial report, and calculating tax. Public works expertise shortage 
covers designing construction specifications, calculating project 
costs, and determining the price of materials to meet with mar- 
ket/standardised prices and local prices. In addition, qualified 
manpower for coordinating at the regency level is not in balance 
with the villages’ number. As previously stated, the first imple- 
mentation of village fiscal transfers dominated by governance 
activities and infrastructure, and in the future if the other au- 
thorities, social services and community empowerment, are de- 
veloped, other constraints might be identified due to the need 
for expertise in those fields. The government responded to this 
situation with organising training for all related actors at the 
regency, district and village levels, but most of all the training 
was given to village heads. In addition, the Ministry of Village 
established village facilitators (Tenaga Pendamping Desa) for giv- 
ing assistance to BPMPD and villages especially. The impact of 
training and of establishing a village facilitator and its effective- 
ness needs to be observed further. 
Opportunity for Complete Autonomy. Fiscal transfers were in- 
tended to preserve local autonomy (Boadway & Shah, 2009), 
and action in village fiscal transfers so far can be defined as ex- 
penditure of autonomy. Of all the collective spending of villages 
  
are categorized as consumptive behaviour based on four village 
local scale authorities’ domain, additionally the author sees an 
investment concept can be applied in the future FY. Village heads 
can allocate some of the transfers in capital/share investment 
accounts to establish village enterprises (Badan Usaha Milik Desa/ 
BUMDes) that run its business cultivating villages’ potential. This 
proposition could create a new perspective on autonomy called 
“revenue autonomy”; in other words, “making money” whilst 
simultaneously utilising a village’s potential and empowering 
communities to improve the village’s economy. This strategy is a 
bit different than establishing tax at the village level, because the 
Indonesian revenues assignment system is very centralised, with 
the most productive tax collections are to the centre even though 
some taxes are levied by the province and regency/city (Shah, 
1998). This dominance makes the potential of levying taxes for 
villages harder. Moreover, the tax policy is not a popular village 
government policy, according to the classification from William 
and Adrian regarding types of community orientation (Box, 
1998). The village community holds traditional (basic and es- 
sential) services as its primary goal; for examples keeping taxes 
low, minimising restrictions, and ensuring the freedom and self- 
reliance of the individual. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The fiscal decentralisation side of Village Law 2014 has cre- 
ated new intergovernmental village fiscal relations in the form 
of fiscal transfers adding village funds (Dana Desa) from the state 
in addition to the prior village fund regency allocation and shared 
regency tax revenues from the regency to finance four domains 
of local-scale village authorities: 1) village governance activities, 
2) village development (infrastructure), 3) social services (rela- 
tions), and 4) community empowerment. This study intends to 
discuss the empirical aftermath of the first policy implementa- 
tion at the vanguard level, focussing on allocation and expendi- 
ture action. The implementation in Banjar Regency has shown 
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that the allocation method of transfers using the base and pro- 
portioned (formula) amounts aimed at establishing sufficient 
village fiscal capacity and maintaining state-regency-village rela- 
tions regardless of the seeming inequality. After spending, infra- 
structure development and remuneration dominated the villages’ 
expenditures. Spending the transfers demands a new role for 
village heads as public finance managers in addition to their ex- 
isting roles as community leaders in political governance. Though 
focussed on upward accountability, most villages accomplished 
the target of transfers spending, however failed to demonstrate 
downward accountability. The fiscal transfers that were included 
in the village budget have created equal opportunities for vil- 
lages’ own projects but lessened the political competition for re- 
gency projects. Overlapping authorities and limitations in hu- 
man resources should be solved immediately to smooth the pro- 
cess of decentralisation in villages. In response to overlapping 
authorities, the regency must set forth and socialise village local- 
scale authorities. Village human resources are the limitation that 
most urgently must be developed in order to provide a balance 
of expertise with an increase of financial resource. Nevertheless, 
the author sees an opportunity for villages to achieve complete 
(revenue and expenditure) autonomy by investing the transfers 
in the establishment of village enterprise or BUMDes. The 
present of village enterprise could be beneficial to village own 
revenue and community economy. 
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY BANJAR REGENCY’S VILLAGES STATISTICS (2015) 
 
Variable Units Number of 
Observation 
Mean Min. Max.  Standard 
Deviation 
Variation 
Coefficient 
Population (2016) people 277 1565 284 7599 1169 0.74 
Population people 277 1582 250 9710 1118 0.70 
Area KM2  277 16.67 0.34 261.66 28.12 1.68 
Poverty Rate people 277 51.82 0.00 455 57.83 1.11 
Geographical Difficulty Index 277 39.99 16.75 77.33 10.86 0.27 
Wage (Rp. million) 277 141.4 131 164.6 9.4 0.06 
Wage (2016) (Rp. million) 277 230 191.7 367.8 32.7 0.14 
Property Tax Target (Rp. million) 277 13.3 0 697 68.4 5.12 
Property Tax Real (Rp. million) 277 6.59 0 361.3 32.4 4.91 
Fiscal Capacity (2016) Index 277 1 0.18 3.58 0.63 0.63 
Fiscal Capacity Index 277 1 0.24 4.65 0.60 0.59 
APBDs Realisation (Rp. million) 277 552 235 915.3 100 0.18 
Governance Activities (Rp. million) 98 200.4 131 424.3 41.4 0.20 
Development (Infrastructure) (Rp. million) 98 334.3 37.78 684.75 86.65 0.25 
Social Service (Relations) (Rp. million) 98 51 8.79 178.9 33.86 0.66 
    Community Empowerment (Rp. million) 98 33.25 7 179.2 32.5 0.97  
 
Source: BPMPD Banjar 
